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Abstract
This paper develops a formal test for consistency of players’ behavior in a series of
games with the quantal response equilibrium (QRE). The test exploits a characterization
of the equilibrium choice probabilities in a QRE as the gradient of a convex function,
which thus satisfies the cyclic monotonicity inequalities. Our testing procedure utilizes
recent econometric results for moment inequality models. We assess the performance of
the test using both Monte Carlo simulation and lab experimental data from a series of
generalized matching pennies games. Our experimental findings are consistent with the
literature: the joint hypothesis of QRE, risk neutrality and player role homogeneity is
rejected in the pooled data, but cannot be rejected in the individual data for over half
of the subjects. By considering subsets of cycle monotonicity inequalities, our approach
also highlights the nature of QRE consistency violations.
JEL classification numbers: C12, C14, C72, C92
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1 Introduction
Many important economic situations arise as an interaction of individual agents who
each independently maximize their utility given their beliefs about the others’ action
plans. Such situations are formally modelled using game theory, where Nash equilibrium
has become the de facto “gold standard”. However, numerous laboratory experiments
demonstrated that people systematically deviate from the Nash equilibrium predictions
in some games while follow them in others (e.g., Goeree & Holt (2001)).
One way to account for these deviations is to introduce random shocks to the players’
payoff functions as it is done in discrete choice models (e.g., McFadden (1974)). But in a
game with several players, these shocks will affect payoffs, and hence players’ actions, in
an endogeneous manner. The precise way of formulating the idea of equilibrium in such
a context was proposed by McKelvey & Palfrey (1995), who introduced the Quantal
Response Equilibrium (QRE): a solution concept that relaxes Nash in a very natural
fashion while preserving the idea of equilibrium. Essentially, the main property of a
QRE is that for each player strategies with higher expected (equilibrium) payoffs must
be played with a higher probability than strategies with lower expected payoffs.
QRE – in particular its logit formulation, which involves a single estimable parameter
– has become a popular tool in experimental economics because typically it provides an
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improved fit to the experimental data. It turned out, though, that without imposing
strong assumptions on the shock distributions, QRE can rationalize any outcome in a
given game (see Haile, Hortacsu, & Kosenok (2008), hereafter HHK). The good news,
though, is that QRE consistency can be tested in a semi-parametric manner (without
assuming specific parametric assumptions on the distribution of utility shocks), and HHK
describe several approaches for testing (without discussing the econometric implementa-
tion of such tests).
Building on this earlier work, in this paper we introduce a new approach for testing
QRE consistency. Our approach is based on the property of cyclic monotonicity, a notion
from convex analysis. Data satisfying this property can be generated by some QRE of
the underlying game. One important advantage of our approach, as in HHK, is that
it is semi-parametric (no need to assume extreme value shocks). Moreover, the cyclic
monotonicity conditions take the form of joint inequality restrictions on the underlying
choice frequencies and payoffs from the underlying game; hence, we are able to apply
tools and methodologies from the recent econometric literature on moment inequality
models to this setting.
In order to illustrate how our test works, we use the data from a lab experiment on
generalized matching pennies where the same subjects play a sequence of several games.
We find that QRE is rejected soundly when data is pooled across all subjects and all
plays of each game. But when we consider subjects individually, we find that the QRE
hypothesis cannot be rejected for upwards of half the subjects. This suggests that there
is substantial heterogeneity in behavior across subjects. Moreover, the congruence of
subjects’ play with QRE varies substantially depending on whether subjects are playing
in the role of the row vs. column player.
Our use of the notion of cyclic monotonicity to test the QRE hypothesis appears new
to the experimental game theory literature. Elsewhere, cyclic monotonicity has been
studied in the context of multidimensional mechanism design. In particular, the papers
by Rochet (1987), Saks & Yu (2005), Lavi & Swamy (2009), Ashlagi et al. (2010), and
Archer & Kleinberg (2014) (summarized in Vohra (2011, Chapter 4)), relate the incen-
tive compatibility (truthful implementation) of a mechanism to its cyclic monotonicity
properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the QRE approach.
Section 3 introduces the test for the QRE hypothesis, and Section 4 discusses the moment
inequalities for testing. Section 5 discusses the statistical properties of the test. Section
2
6 describes our experiment, with subsections 6.1 and 6.2 presenting the experimental
design and results respectively. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 QRE background
In this section we briefly review the main ideas behind the QRE approach. We use the
notation from McKelvey & Palfrey (1995).
Consider a finite n-person gameG(N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N). The set of strategies available
to player i is indexed by j = 1, . . . , Ji, so that Si = {s1, . . . , sJi}. We will occasionally
abuse notation and write j ∈ Si. Let s denote an n-vector strategy profile; let si and
s−i denote player i’s (scalar) action and the vector of actions for all players other than i.
In terms of notation, all vectors are denoted by bold letters. Let pij be the probability
that player i chooses action j, and pi denote the vector of player i’s choice probabilities.
Let p = (p1, . . . ,pn) denote the vector of probabilities across all the players. Player i’s
utility function is given by ui(si, s−i). At the time she chooses her action, she does not
know what actions the other players will play. Define the expected utility that player i
gets from playing a pure strategy sij when everyone else’s joint strategy is p−i as
uij(p) ≡ uij(p−i) =
∑
s−i
p(s−i)ui(sij, s−i),
where s−i = (skjk)k∈N−i , and p(s−i) =
∏
k∈N−i pkjk .
In the QRE framework uncertainty is generated by players’ making “mistakes”. This
is modelled by assuming that, given her beliefs about the opponents’ actions p−i, when
choosing her action, player i does not choose the action j that maximizes her expected
utility uij(p), but rather chooses the action that maximizes uij(p) + εij, where εij rep-
resents a preference shock at action j. For each player i ∈ N let εi = (εi1, . . . , εiJi) be
drawn according to an absolutely continuous distribution Fi with mean zero. Then an
expected utility maximizer, player i, given beliefs p, chooses action j iff
uij(p) + εij ≥ uij′(p) + εij′ , ∀j′ 6= j.
Since preference shocks are random, the probability of choosing action j given beliefs p,
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denoted piij(p), can be formally expressed as
piij(p) ≡ P
(
j = arg max
j′∈{1,...,Ji}
{uij′(p) + εij′}
)
=
∫
{εi∈RJi | uij(p)+εij≥uij′ (p)+εij′ ∀j′∈{1,...,Ji}}
dFi(εi) (1)
Then a quantal response equilibrium is defined as a set of choice probabilities
{
pi∗ij
}
such that for all (i, j) ∈ N × {1, . . . , Ji},
pi∗ij = piij(pi
∗)
Throughout, we assume that all players’ preference shock distributions are invariant ;
that is, the distribution does not depend on the payoffs:
Assumption 1. (Invariant shock distribution) For all realizations εi := (εi1, . . . , εiJi)
and all payoff functions ui(·), we have Fi(εi|ui(·)) = Fi(εi).
Such an invariance assumption was also considered in HHK’s study of the quantal
response model, and also assumed in most empirical implementations of QRE.1
QRE as a noisy Nash equilibrium. As noted before, QRE captures the idea
that players make mistakes when they choose optimal strategies. According to this, the
concept of QRE may be seen as a “noisy” version of a Nash equilibrium (NE). This way
of understanding QRE has been recognized by the literature on learning on games. As
a matter of fact, this literature has coined the term of smooth best responses (Fudenberg
& Levine, 1998) and perturbed best responses (Hofbauer & Sandholm, 2002) to refer to
QRE.
A key insight from this literature is the explicit formulation of a QRE as a noisy
version of a Nash equilibrium. In particular, Hofbauer & Sandholm (2002) show that
a QRE can be seen as the Nash equilibrium of a perturbed game in which each player
chooses the mixed strategy that maximizes the difference between her expected payoffs
and a penalty-entropy term. To see the intuition behind this result, consider the special
case of logit QRE. In this case, their result is equivalent to saying that pi∗ is a QRE if
1Most applications of QRE assume that the utility shocks follow a logistic distribution, regardless of
the magnitude of payoffs. One exception is McKelvey, Palfrey, & Weber (2000), who allow the logit-
QRE parameter to vary across different games. This direction is further developed in Rogers, Palfrey,
& Camerer (2009).
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and only if for each player i ∈ N , pi∗i maximizes
Ji∑
j=1
uij(pi
∗
−i)piij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected payoff
−λ
Ji∑
j=1
piij ln(piij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Perturbation
where λ > 0 is the localization parameter of the logistic distribution. It is straightforward
to see that solving for pi∗i we obtain the logit choice probabilities.
From the previous specification it follows that the logit QRE is just a noisy NE, where
the noise in players’ payoffs is captured by the perturbation (entropy) −λ∑Jij=1 piij ln(piij).
It is easy to see that when λ = 0, a QRE coincides with a Nash equilibrium; for λ > 0,
a QRE will diverge from NE.2
3 A test based on convex analysis
In this section we propose a test for the QRE hypothesis. We start by defining the
following function:
ϕi(ui(pi))≡E
[
max
j∈Si
{uij(pi)+εij}
]
In the discrete choice model literature, the expression ϕ(u) is known as the social surplus
function.3 Importantly, this function is smooth and convex. Now the QRE probabilities
piij(pi
∗) can be expressed as
pi∗i =∇ϕi(ui(pi∗)) (2)
This follows from the well-known Williams-Daly-Zachary theorem from discrete-choice
theory (which can be considered a version of Roy’s Identity for discrete choice models;
2Beyond the logit case, an analogous perturbation representation exists for the case where for each
player i ∈ N the random variables εi = (εi1, . . . , εiJi) are drawn according to an absolutely continuous
distribution Fi with mean zero. For this general case, Hofbauer & Sandholm (2002) show that the
perturbation term is given by a strictly convex function Vi(pii), and pi
∗ is a QRE if and only if for each
player i ∈ N , pi∗i maximizes
∑Ji
j=1 uij(pi
∗
−i)piij − Vi(pii). For details, see Cominetti, Melo, & Sorin (2010)
and Mertikopoulos & Sandholm (2014).
3For details see McFadden (1981).
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see Rust (1994, p.3104)). Namely, assuming sufficient smoothness of Fi, one can write
∂ϕi(ui(pi
∗))
∂uij(pi∗)
=
∂
∂uij(pi∗)
∫
RJi
[
max
`∈Si
{ui`(pi∗)+εi`}
]
dFi(εi)
=
∫
RJi
∂
∂uij(pi∗)
[
max
`∈Si
{ui`(pi∗)+εi`}
]
dFi(εi)
=
∫
{εi∈RJi | uij(pi∗)+εij≥ui`(pi∗)+εi` ∀`∈Si}
dFi(εi)
= piij(pi
∗)
Thus if Eq. (2) holds for all players i, then
{
pi∗ij
}
is a quantal response equilibrium.
Eq. (2) characterizes the QRE choice probabilities as the gradient of the convex func-
tion ϕ. It is well-known (see Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 24.8)) that the gradient of a
convex function satisfies a cyclic monotonicity property. This property is the general-
ization, for functions of several variables, of the fact that the derivative of a univariate
convex function is monotone nondecreasing.
To define cyclic monotonicity in our setting, consider a sequence of games character-
ized by the same set of choices for each player, but distinguished by payoff differences. Let
[pi∗i ]
m denote the QRE choice probabilities for player i in game Gm, and u
m
i ≡ umi ([pi∗]m)
the corresponding equilibrium expected payoffs. Then the cyclic monotonicity property
says that
L−1∑
m=0
〈
[ui]
m+1 − [ui]m, [pi∗i ]m
〉
≤ 0 (3)
for all finite game cycles4 of length L ≥ 2, and all players i.5 Expanding the inner product
notation, the cyclic monotonicity conditions may be written as follows:
L−1∑
m=0
Ji∑
j=1
(
um+1ij − umij
)
[pi∗ij]
m ≤ 0 (4)
This property only holds under the invariance assumption.
The number of all finite game cycles times the number of players can be, admittedly,
very large. To reduce it, we note that the cyclic monotonicity conditions (4) are invariant
4A cycle of length L is just a sequence of L games G0, . . . , GL−2, GL−1 with GL−1 = G0.
5Under convexity of ϕ(·), we have ϕ(um+1i ) ≥ ϕ(umi ) +
〈∇ϕ(umi ), (um+1i − umi )〉. Substituting in
∇ϕ(umi ) = pimi and summing across a cycle, we obtain the CM inequality in Eq. (3).
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under circular permutations of game cycles; for instance, the inequalities emerging from
the cycles Gi, . . . , Gj, Gk, Gi and Gj, . . . , Gk, Gi, Gj are the same.
Two Remarks. [1] When each player’s strategy set has only two pure strategies, the
cycle monotonicity conditions (4) only need to be checked for cycles of length 2. Because
many experiments study games where players’ strategy sets consist of two elements, this
observation turns out to be useful from an applied perspective.6
[2] What do violations of these CM inequalities pick up? Recall from the earlier
discussion that QRE is a “noisy” version of Nash equilibrium. The games that we consider
in our experimental application below have a unique (mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium,
so that the CM inequalities will be satisfied when agents’ observed choice probabilities
do not vary “too much” from the equilibrium choice probabilities. Indeed, the CM
inequalities are exactly satisfied (with equality) at the noiseless mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium. Hence, violations of the CM inequalities suggest that players’ actions are
not best responses to opponents’ play, once “noise” has been accounted for. We will
discuss the interpretation of CM inequalities violations more in subsection 6.2 below. 
4 Moment inequalities for testing
Consistency with QRE can be tested nonparametrically from experimental data in which
the same subject i is playing a series of one-shot games with the same strategy spaces
such that each game is played multiple times. In this case, the experimental data allows
to estimate a vector of probabilities [pi∗i ]
m ∈ ∆(Si) for each game m in the sample,
and we can compute the corresponding equilibrium expected utilities [ui]
m (assuming
risk-neutrality).
Suppose there are M ≥ 2 different games in the sample. We assume that we are able
to obtain estimates of pˆimi , the empirical choice frequencies, from the experimental data,
for each subject i and for each game m. Thus we compute pˆimij from K trials for subject
i in game m:
pˆimij =
1
K
K∑
k=1
1{i chooses j in trial k of game m}
6Formally, this fact follows from the observation that for games with strategy sets of two actions, we
can rewrite the functions ϕi(ui(pi)) as ϕi(ui1(pi)) = ϕi(ui1(pi)−ui2(pi), 0)+ui2(pi). Noting that without
loss of generality we can normalize ui2(pi) to be constant, we get that ϕi(u(pi)) is a univariate function.
Using Rochet (1987, Proposition 2) we conclude that if ϕi satisfies (4) for all cycles of length 2, then (4)
is also satisfied for cycles of arbitrary length L > 2.
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This will be the source of the sampling error in our econometric setup. Also, let uˆmi ≡
umi (pˆi
m) be the estimated equilibrium expected utilities obtained by plugging in the
observed choice probabilities pˆim into the payoffs in game m. Then the sample moment
inequalities take the following form: for all cycles of length L ∈ {2, . . . ,M}
L−1∑
m=0
Ji∑
j=1
(
uˆm+1ij − uˆmij
)
pˆimij ≤ 0 (5)
Altogether, in an n-person game we have n
∑M
L=2 #C(L) moment inequalities, where
#C(L) is the number of different (up to a circular permutation) cycles of length L.
These inequalities make up a necessary condition for a finite sample of games to be
QRE-consistent.
Remarks. To estimate expected payoffs in our test we had to assume that players
are risk-neutral. This assumption might be too strong a priori (e.g., Goeree, Holt, &
Palfrey (2000) argue that risk aversion can help explain QRE inconsistencies). Notice,
however, that the test itself does not depend on risk-neutrality: it only requires that
we know the form of the utility function. Thus under additional assumptions about the
utility, we can also investigate how risk aversion affects the test results. See section 6.2
for details.
Furthermore, even when players are risk-neutral, we compute the expected payoffs
using observed choice frequencies, which may be different from true choice probabilities
used in the CM conditions. It is therefore interesting to investigate the set of admissible
utility indices/probability distributions for which QRE is not rejected by the CM test. We
will consider these possibilities in our simulations and empirical implementation below.
Our test also assumes that for each of the games considered, there is only one unique
QRE. Note that since we do not specify the distribution of the random utility shocks, this
uniqueness assumption is not verifiable. Therefore, in principle, our test may wrongly re-
ject (i.e., it is biased) against the null hypothesis that there are multiple quantal response
equilibria played in the data. Several considerations make us feel that this possibility is
not likely. First, in our experiments, the subjects are randomly matched across different
rounds of each game, so that playing multiple equilibria in the course of an experiment
would require a great deal or coordination. Second, all the games that we consider have
unique Nash equilibria, when there are no QRE disturbances. Indeed, practically all
of the empirical studies of experimental data utilizing the quantal response framework
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assume that a unique equilibrium is played in the data, so that the observed choices are
drawn from a homogeneous sampling environment.7
Given the remarks here, our test of QRE should be considered, strictly speaking, a
joint test of the QRE hypothesis along with those of risk neutrality of the subjects and
unique equilibrium. 
“Cumulative rank” test. HHK propose alternative methods of testing the QRE
model based on cumulative rankings of choice probabilities across perturbed games,8
which also imply stochastic equalities or inequalities involving estimated choice prob-
abilities from different games. We will show here that, in fact, our CM conditions are
directly related to HHK’s rank-cumulative probability conditions in the special case when
we only have two games (i.e. all cycles are of length 2), and under a certain non-negativity
condition on utility differences between the games.
Formally, HHK consider two perturbed games with the same strategy spaces and
re-order strategy indices for each player i such that
u˜1i1 − u˜0i1 ≥ u˜1i2 − u˜0i2 ≥ . . . ≥ u˜1iJi − u˜0iJi
where u˜mij ≡ ui(sij,pim−i) − 1Ji
∑Ji
j=1 ui(sij,pi
m
−i) for m = 0, 1. These inequalities can be
equivalently rewritten as
u1i1 − u0i1 ≥ u1i2 − u0i2 ≥ . . . ≥ u1iJi − u0iJi (6)
HHK’s Theorem 2 states that given the indexing in (6) and assuming invariance (see
Assumption 1), QRE consistency implies the following cumulative rank property:
k∑
j=1
(pi1ij − pi0ij) ≥ 0; for all k = 1, . . . , Ji. (7)
This property is related to our test as the following proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 1. Let M = 2. If all expected utility differences in (6) are non-negative,
then HHK rank cumulative condition (7) implies the CM inequalities (4). Conversely,
7For this reason, our test may not be appropriate for testing for QRE using field data, which were
not generated under these controlled laboratory experimental conditions. See De Paula & Tang (2012)
for a test of multiple equilibria presence in the data.
8HHK also describe another testing approach which utilizes Block-Marschak polynomials involving
choice probabilities across games with different choice sets, but this is unrelated to our approach in this
paper.
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(4) implies HHK condition (7) (without additional assumptions on expected utility differ-
ences).
Proof. See Appendix A.
5 Econometric implementation of the test
In this section we consider the formal econometric properties of our test. Let ν ∈ RP ,
where P ≡ n∑ML=2 #C(L), and #C(L) is the number of different (up to a circular
permutation) cycles of length L, denote the vector of the left hand sides of the cyclic
monotonicity inequalities (4), written out for all cycle lengths and all players. Namely, let
us order all players and all different cycles of length L from 2 to M in a single ordering,
and for ` ∈ {1, . . . , P}, let L(`) refer to the cycle length at coordinate number ` in
this ordering, m0(`) refer to the first game in the respective cycle, and ι(`) refer to the
corresponding player at coordinate number `. Then we can write ν ≡ (ν1, . . . , ν`, . . . , νP )
where each generic component ν` is given by (5), i.e.
ν` =
L(`)−1∑
m=m0(`)
Jι(`)∑
j=1
∑
s−ι(`)
pimι(`)j
 ∏
k∈N−ι(`)
pim+1kjk
um+1ι(`) (sι(`)j, s−ι(`))
−
 ∏
k∈N−ι(`)
pimkjk
umι(`)(sι(`)j, s−ι(`))
 (8)
Define µ ≡ −ν, then cyclic monotonicity is equivalent to µ ≥ 0. Let µˆ denote the
estimate of µ from our experimental data. In our setting, the sampling error is in the
choice probabilities pi’s. Using the Delta method, we can derive that, asymptotically
(when the number of trials of each game out of a fixed set of M games goes to infinity),
µˆ
a∼ N(µ0,Σ) and Σ = JV J ′
where V denotes the variance-covariance matrix for the Mn× 1-vector pi and J denotes
the P ×Mn Jacobian matrix of the transformation from pi to µ. Since P >> Mn, the
resulting matrix Σ is singular.9
9Note also that Σ is the approximation of the finite-sample covariance matrix, so that the square-
roots of its diagonal elements correspond to the standard errors; i.e. the elements are already “divided
through” by the sample size, which accounts for the differences between the equations below and the
corresponding ones in Andrews & Soares (2010).
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We want to perform the hypothesis test:
H0 : µ0 ≥ 0 vs. H1 : µ0 ∈ RP
Given the large number of moment inequalities in our test (in the application, P = 40),
we utilize the Generalized Moment Selection (GMS) procedure of Andrews & Soares
(2010). Letting Σˆ denote an estimate of Σ, we define the test statistic
S(µˆ, Σˆ) :=
P∑
`=1
[
µˆ`/σˆ`
]2
− (9)
where [x]− denotes x · 1(x < 0), and σˆ21, . . . , σˆ2P denote the diagonal elements of Σˆ. The
test statistic is sum of squared violations across the moment inequalities.
The general intuition of the GMS procedure is to evaluate the asymptotic distribution
of the test statistic under a sequence of null hypotheses which resemble the sample
moment inequalities, and are drifting to zero. By doing this, moment inequalities which
are far from binding in the sample (i.e. the elements of µˆ which are >> 0) will not
contribute to the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic, leading to a (stochastically)
smaller distribution and hence smaller critical values.10
To obtain valid critical values for S under H0, we use the following procedure from
Andrews & Soares (2010):
1. Let D ≡ Diag−1/2(Σˆ) denote the diagonal matrix with elements 1/σˆ1, . . . , 1/σˆP .
Compute Ω ≡ D · Σˆ ·D.
2. Compute the vector ξ = κ−1z · D · µˆ which is equal to 1κz ·
[
µˆ1
σˆ1
, µˆ
2
σˆ2
, · · · , µˆP
σˆP
]′
where
κz = (log z)
1/2.11 Here z ≡ N
4
is the total number of rounds of each of the four
games, and N is the sample size.
3. For r = 1, . . . , R, we generate Zr ∼ N(0,Ω) and compute sr ≡ S(Zr + [ξ]+,Ω),
where [x]+ = max(x, 0).
4. Take the critical value c1−α as the (1− α)-th quantile among {s1, s2, . . . , sR}.
10In contrast, other inequality based testing procedure (e.g., Wolak (1989)) evaluate the asymptotic
distribution of the test statistic under the “least-favorable” null hypothesis µ = 0, which may lead to
very large critical values and low power against alternative hypotheses of interest.
11Andrews & Soares (2010) mention several alternative choices for κz. We investigate their perfor-
mance in the Monte Carlo simulations reported below.
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Essentially, the asymptotic distribution of S is evaluated at the null hypothesis [ξ]+ ≥ 0
which, because of the normalizing sequence κz, is drifting towards zero. In finite samples,
this will tend to increase the number of rejections, which is confirmed in our simulations,
which we turn to next.
5.1 Monte Carlo simulations
As test games, we used a series of four card-matching games where each player has
three choices. These games are so-called “Joker” games which have been studied in the
previous experimental literature (cf. O’Neill (1987) and Brown & Rosenthal (1990)),
and can be considered generalizations of the familiar “matching pennies” game in which
each player calls out one of three possible cards, and the payoffs depend on whether
the called-out cards match or not. Since these games will also form the basis for our
laboratory experiments below, we will describe them in some detail here.
“Joker” games. In our choice of games, we had several considerations. We wanted
to use simple games comparable to games from the previous literature. Moreover, we
wanted our test to be sufficiently powerful. This last consideration steered us away from
games for which we know that some structural QRE (in particular, the Logit QRE)
performs very well so that the chance to fail the CM conditions is pretty low. Table
1 shows the payoff matrices of the four games which we used in our simulations and
experiments.
Each of these games has a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probabilities of
which are given in bold font in the margins of the payoff matrices. Note that the four
games in Table 1 differ only by Row player’s payoff. Equilibrium logic, hence, dictates
that the Row player’s equilibrium choice probabilities never change across the four games,
but that the Column player should change her mixtures to maintain the Row’s indifference
amongst choices.
Game 1 has all symmetric choices for each player. Here, the expected equilibrium
payoff for Row is 50/3, and for Column is 70/3. Game 2 increases Row’s payoff when
both players match at the Joker (denoted “J”). Now Nash equilibrium requires Col-
umn to choose Joker almost two times less often than before to keep Row indifferent.
Expected equilibrium payoff for Column stays the same – 70/3, while Row’s expected
payoff increases to 200/11.
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Table 1: Four 3× 3 games inspired by the Joker Game of O’Neill (1987).
Game 1 (Symmetric Joker) 1 2 J
[1/3] (.325) [1/3] (.308) [1/3] (.367)
1 [1/3] (.273) 10, 30 30, 10 10, 30
2 [1/3] (.349) 30, 10 10, 30 10, 30
J [1/3] (.378) 10, 30 10, 30 30, 10
Game 2 (Low Joker) 1 2 J
[9/22] (.359) [9/22] (.439) [4/22] (.202)
1 [1/3] (.253) 10, 30 30, 10 10, 30
2 [1/3] (.304) 30, 10 10, 30 10, 30
J [1/3] (.442) 10, 30 10, 30 55, 10
Game 3 (High Joker) 1 2 J
[4/15] (.258) [4/15] (.323) [7/15] (.419)
1 [1/3] (.340) 25, 30 30, 10 10, 30
2 [1/3] (.464) 30, 10 25, 30 10, 30
J [1/3] (.196) 10, 30 10, 30 30, 10
Game 4 (Low 2) 1 2 J
[2/5] (.487) [1/5] (.147) [2/5] (.366)
1 [1/3] (.473) 20, 30 30, 10 10, 30
2 [1/3] (.220) 30, 10 10, 30 10, 30
J [1/3] (.307) 10, 30 10, 30 30, 10
Notes. For each game, the unique Nash equilibrium choice probabilities are given in bold font within
brackets, while the probabilities in regular font within parentheses are aggregate choice probabilities
from our experimental data, described in Section 6.1.
Game 3 increases Row’s payoffs when players match at 1 or 2, compared to Game 1.
Now, in a Nash equilibrium, Column must play the Joker almost 50% of the time to keep
Row indifferent. The expected equilibrium payoff for Column stays the same – 70/3,
while Row’s expected payoff increases up to 58/3. In Games 1–3, the strategies 1 and 2
are played with the same probability by Column. Game 4 introduces some asymmetry
between 1 and 2, making strategies 1 and J equivalent for Column, and raises Row’s
payoff to 20 when both match at 1. These changes do not affect Column’s expected
equilibrium payoffs, while Row’s expected payoff rises to 18. Thus this set of games
allows for a rich set of predictions, both in terms of equilibrium choice probabilities and
in terms of equivalence of pairs of strategies for Column.
Monte Carlo simulations. For the Monte Carlo simulations, we first considered
artificial data generated under the QRE hypothesis. Table 2 shows the results of the
GMS test procedure applied to our setup in terms of the number of rejections. From
Table 2, we see that the test tends to (slightly) underreject under the QRE null for most
values of the tuning parameter κz. The results appear relatively robust to changes in κz;
a reasonable choice appears to be κz = 5(log(z))
1
4 . In a second set of simulations, we
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generated artificial data under non-QRE play (specifically, we generated a set of choice
probabilities that generate violations of all of the CM inequalities for both players). The
results here are quite stark: in all our simulations, and for all the tuning parameters that
we tried, we find that the QRE hypothesis is rejected in every single replication. Thus
our proposed test appears to have very good power properties.
Table 2: Monte Carlo simulation results under QRE-consistent data
Tuning parameter κz
N # rejecteda at 5(log(z))
1
2 5(log(z))
1
4 5(log(z))
1
8 5(2 log log(z))
1
2
1000 95% 7 9 13 7
90% 13 17 26 14
80% 33 54 68 46
5000 95% 13 32 43 21
90% 26 55 77 41
80% 61 102 124 85
9000 95% 18 40 51 32
90% 33 61 79 53
80% 65 114 143 97
Notes. z = N4 is the total number of rounds of each of the four games. All numbers
in columns 3–6 are observed rejections out of 500 replications. All computations
use R = 1000 to simulate the corresponding critical values.
a: # rejected out of 500 replications.
6 Experimental evidence
In this section we describe an empirical application of our test to data generated from
laboratory experiments. Lab experiments appear ideal for our test because the invariance
of the distribution of utility shocks across games (Assumption 1) may be more likely to
hold in a controlled lab setting than in the field.
Our testing procedure can be applied to the experimental data from Games 1–4 as
follows. As defined previously, let the P -dimensional vector ν contain the value of the
CM inequalities evaluated at the choice frequencies observed in the experimental data.
Using our four games, we can construct cycles of length 2, 3, and 4. Thus we have 12
possible orderings of 2-cycles, 24 possible orderings of 3-cycles, and 24 possible orderings
of 4-cycles. Since CM inequalities are invariant to circular permutations, it is sufficient
to consider the following 20 cycles of Games 1− 4:
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121, 131, 141, 232, 242, 343
1231, 1241, 1321, 1341, 1421, 1431, 2342, 2432
12341, 12431, 13241, 13421, 14231, 14321 (10)
Moreover, these 20 cycles are distinct depending on whether we are considering the
actions facing the row or column player (which involve different payoffs); thus the total
number of cycles across the four games and the two player roles is P = 40. This is the
number of coordinates of vector ν, defined in (8). Additional details on the implemen-
tation of the test, including explicit expressions for the variance-covariance matrix of ν,
are provided in Appendix B.
6.1 Experimental design
The subjects in our laboratory experiments were undergraduate students at the Univer-
sity of California, Irvine, and all experiments were conducted at the ESSL lab there. We
conducted 3 sessions where subjects played, in different sequences, either some or all of
the four games in Table 1. Subjects played the following sequences of games: 12, 23, and
3412. In the first two sessions, subjects played 20 rounds per game; in the last session
subjects played 10 rounds per game. To reduce repeated game effects, subjects were
randomly rematched each round. To reduce framing effects, the payoffs for every subject
were displayed as “row player” payoffs, and actions were abstractly labelled A, B, and
C for the row player, and D, E, and F for the column player.
In addition to recording the actual choice frequencies in each round of the game,
we periodically also asked the subjects to report their beliefs regarding the likelihood
of their current opponent playing each of the three strategies. Each subject was asked
this question once s/he had chosen her action but before the results of the game were
displayed. To simplify exposition, we used a two-thumb slider which allowed subjects
to easily adjust the probability distribution among three choices. Thus we were able to
compare the CM tests based on subjective probability estimates with the ones based on
actual choices.12
12We chose not to incentivize belief elicitation rounds largely to avoid imposing extra complexity on
the subjects. Thus our results using elicited belief estimates should be taken with some caution. On
the other hand, if what we elicited was completely meaningless, we would not observe as much QRE
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The complete instructions of the experiment are provided in Appendix C.
6.2 Experiment results
We start analyzing the experimental data by reporting the aggregate choice frequencies
in Games 1–4 in Table 1 alongside Nash equilibrium predictions. Comparing theory with
the data, we see that there is a lot of deviations from Nash for both column and row
players.
Table 3 is our main results table. It shows the test results of checking the cyclic
monotonicity conditions with our experimental data.
Based on our current dataset, we find that QRE is soundly rejected for the pooled data
(with test statistic 68.194 and 95% critical value 29.985). This may not be too surprising,
since in our design subjects experience both player roles (row and column), and so this
pooled test imposes the auxiliary assumption on all subjects being homogeneous across
roles in that their utility shocks are drawn from identical distributions.
Therefore, in the remaining portion of Table 3, we test the QRE hypothesis separately
for different subsamples of the data. First, we consider separately the CM inequalities
pertaining to row players and those pertaining to column players.13 By doing this, we al-
low the utility shock distributions to differ depending on a subject’s role (but conditional
on role, to still be identical across subjects).
We find that while we still reject QRE14 for the row players, we cannot do so for
column players. Thus overall QRE-inconsistency is largely due to the behavior of the
row players. Seeing that row players’ inequalities are violated more often than column
players’ inequalities suggests that row players do not appear to be best responding to
their opponents. That the violations come predominantly from the choices of row players
is interesting because, as we discussed above, the column players’ payoffs are the same
across all the games in our experiment, but vary across games for the row player.
consistency as we do in our subject-by-subject results below.
13Note that the sum of the test statistics corresponding to the column and row inequalities sum up to
the overall test statistic; this is because the row and column inequalities are just subsets of the full set
of inequalities.
14Strictly speaking, this is no longer a test of QRE, because by restricting attention to cycles pertaining
to only one player role, we essentially consider only one-player equilibrium version of QRE, which is more
akin to a discrete choice problem.
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Table 3: Testing for Cyclic Monotonicity in Experimental Data: Generalized Moment
Selection
Data sample AS test stat cR0.95
All subjects pooled:
All cycles 68.194 29.985
Row cycles 68.194 26.265
Col cycles 0.000 6.835
Subject-by-subject: Avg AS Avg cR0.95 # rejected Avg CM violations
at 95% at 90% at 80% (% of total)
Subj. v. selfa
(Total subj.: 96)
All cycles 212.570 18.538 29 37 41 41.59
Row cycles 203.108 12.421 20 26 31 44.53
Column cycles 9.462 11.849 18 19 21 38.65
Subj. v. othersb
(Total subj.: 96)
Row cycles 3.936 10.920 7 11 15 35.00
(Total subj.: 96)
Col cycles 103.872 11.734 16 18 22 38.70
Subj. v. beliefsc
(Total subj.: 59)
Row cycles 3.681 6.883 5 5 5 33.051
(Total subj.: 61)
Col cycles 9.622 8.732 10 13 14 35.000
Notes. All computations use R = 1, 000. In subject-by-subject computations some subjects in some roles exhibited zero choice variance,
so in those cases we replaced the corresponding (ill-defined) elements of Diag−1/2(Σˆ) with ones and when computing the test statistic,
left out the corresponding components of µˆ. The tuning parameter in AS procedure was set equal to κz = 5(log(z))
1
4 .
av. self: the opponent’s choice frequencies are obtained from the same subject playing the respective opponent’s role.
bv. others: the opponent’s choice frequencies are averages over the subject’s actual opponents’ choices when the subject was playing
her respective role in column (ii).
cv. beliefs: the opponent’s choice frequencies are averages over the subject’s elicited beliefs about the opponent choices when the subject
was playing the respective role (since belief elicitation rounds were fixed at the session level, subjects’ beliefs may not be elicited in
some roles and some games. We dropped them from the analysis).
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Continuing in this vein, the lower panel of Table 3 considers tests of the QRE hypoth-
esis for each subject individually. Obviously, this allows the distributions of the utility
shocks to differ across subjects. For these subject-by-subject tests, there is a question
about how to determine a given’s subject beliefs about his opponents’ play. We consider
three alternatives: (i) set beliefs about opponents equal to the subject’s own play in the
opponent’s role; (ii) set beliefs about opponents equal to opponents’ actual play (i.e.,
as if the subject was playing against an average opponent); and (iii) set beliefs about
opponents equal to the subject’s elicited beliefs regarding the opponents’ play.
The results appear largely robust across these three alternative ways of setting sub-
jects’ beliefs. We see that we are not able to reject the QRE hypothesis for most of the
subjects, for significance levels going from 80% to 95%. When we further break down
each subject’s observations depending on his/her role (as column or row player), thus
allowing the utility shock distributions to differ not only across subjects but also for each
subject in each role, the number of rejections decreases even more. Curiously, we see
that in the subject vs. self results, the row inequalities generate more violations, while
the column inequalities generate more violations in the subject vs. others results.
One caveat here, is that when we are testing on a subject-by-subject basis, we are,
strictly speaking, no longer testing an equilibrium hypothesis, because we are not testing
– and indeed, cannot test given the randomized pairing of subjects in the experiments –
whether the given subject’s opponents are playing optimally according to a QRE. Hence,
our tests should be interpreted as tests of subjects’ “best response” behavior given beliefs
about how their opponents’ play.
The general trend of these findings – that the QRE hypothesis appears more sta-
tistically plausible once we allow for sufficient heterogeneity across subjects and across
roles – confirms existing results in McKelvey, Palfrey, & Weber (2000) who, within the
parametric logit QRE framework and asymmetric matching pennies, also found evidence
increasing for the QRE hypothesis once subject-level heterogeneity was accommodated.
Robustness check: Nonlinear utility and risk aversion. Our test results above
are computed under the assumption of risk-neutrality. Goeree, Holt, & Palfrey (2000)
have shown that allowing for nonlinear utility (i.e. risk aversion) greatly improves the
fit of QRE to experimental evidence. Since our test can be applied under quite general
specification of payoff functions, to see the effects of risk aversion on the test results we
recomputed our test under an alternative assumption that for each player, utility from
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a payoff of x is u(x) = x1−r, where r ∈ [0, 1) is a constant relative risk aversion factor.15
Here, we computed the test statistics and critical values for values of r ranging from 0
to 0.99.
When we pool all the subjects together, we find results very similar to what is reported
in Table 3: QRE is rejected when all cycles are considered; it is also rejected when only
the row cycles are considered; it cannot be rejected when only the column cycles are
considered, for all values of r ∈ [0, 0.99]. Thus we do not observe any risk effects in the
pooled data.16
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Figure 1: Effects of risk aversion on subject-by-subject rejections
Breaking down these data on a subject-by-subject basis, we once again see that allow-
ing for risk aversion does not change our previous results obtained under the assumption
of linear utility. Specifically, as graphed in Figure 1, the number of rejections of the QRE
hypothesis for the “subject vs. self” specification is relatively stable for all r < 0.99,
staying at about 21 rejections at 95% level, at about 23 rejections at 90% level, and
between 25 and 30 rejections at 80% level. Thus our analysis here suggests the our test
results are not driven by risk aversion.
15For r = 1 the log-utility form is used. In our computations, we restrict the largest value of r to 0.99
to avoid dealing with this issue.
16For space reasons, we have not reported all the test statistics and critical values, but they are
available from the authors upon request.
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More generally, risk aversion might be an important factor in other games, so check-
ing for the potential effects of risk aversion on test results might be a necessary post-
estimation step.
7 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper we present a new approach for testing the QRE hypothesis in finite normal
form games. The testing approach is based on moment inequalities derived from the
cyclic monotonicity condition, which is in turn derived from the convexity of the random
utility model underlying the QRE hypothesis. We investigate the performance of our
test using a lab experiment where subjects play a series of generalized matching pennies
games.
While we primarily focus on developing a test of the QRE hypothesis in games in-
volving two or more players, our procedure can also be applied to situations of stochastic
individual choice. Thus our test can be viewed more generally as a semiparametric test
of quantal response, and, in particular, discrete choice models. Moreover, in finite action
games as considered here, QRE has an identical structure to Bayesian Nash equilibria
in discrete games of incomplete information which have been considered in the empirical
industrial organization literature (e.g. Bajari et al. (2010), De Paula & Tang (2012), or
Liu, Vuong, and Xu (2013)). Our approach can potentially be useful for specification
testing in those settings; however, as we remarked above, one hurdle to implementing
such tests on field data is the possibility of multiple equilibria. Adapting these tests to
allow for multiple equilibria is a challenging avenue for future research.
References
D. Andrews and G Soares (2010). Inference for Parameters Defined by Moment Inequal-
ities using Generalized Moment Selection, Econometrica, 78(1): 119-157.
A. Archer and R. Kleinberg (2014). Truthful germs are contagious: A local to global
characterization of truthfulness, Games and Economic Behavior, 86: 340–366.
I. Ashlagi, M. Braverman, A. Hassidim, and D. Monderer (2010). Monotonicity and
Implementability, Econometrica, 78(5): 1749–1772
20
P. Bajari, H. Hong, J. Krainer, and D. Nekipelov (2010). Estimating Static Models of
Strategic Interactions, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 28: 469-482.
J. N. Brown and R.W. Rosenthal (1990). Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-
Examination of O’Neill’s Game Experiment, Econometrica, 58: 1065-1081.
R. Cominetti, E. Melo, and S. Sorin, A payoff-based learning procedure and its applica-
tion to traffic games. Games and Economic Behavior, 70: 71–83.
A. de Paula and X. Tang (2012). Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simulataneous
Games with Incomplete Information, Econometrica, 80(1): 143-172.
I. Erev and A.E. Roth (1998). Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learn-
ing in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria, American Eco-
nomic Review, 88(4): 848-881.
D. Fudenberg and D. Levine. The theory of learning in games, MIT Press: Cambridge,
MA, 1998.
J. Fox (2007). Semiparametric Estimation of Multinomial Discrete-Choice Models using
a Subset of Choices. RAND Journal of Economics, 38: 1002–1029.
J. Goeree and C. Holt (2001). Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive
Contradictions. American Economic Review, 91(5):1402–1422.
J. Goeree, C. Holt, and T. Palfrey (2000). Risk Averse Behavior in Asymmetric Matching
Pennies Games. Working paper, University of Virginia.
J. Goeree, C. Holt, and T. Palfrey (2003). Risk Averse Behavior in Generalized Matching
Pennies Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 45:97-113.
J. Goeree, C. Holt, and T. Palfrey (2005). Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium, Ex-
perimental Economics, 8(4): 347-67.
P. Haile, A. Hortacsu, and G. Kosenok (2008). On the Empirical Content of Quantal
Response Models. American Economic Review, 98:180–200.
J. Hofbauer and W. Sandholm (2002). On the global convergence of stochastic fictitious
play. Econometrica, 70 (6): 2265–2294 .
R. Lavi and C.Swamy (2009), Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling
via cycle monotonicity, Games and Economic Behavior, 67: 99-124.
21
N. Liu, Q. Vuong & H. Xu (2013). Rationalization and Identification of Discrete Games
with Correlated Types. Working paper.
D. McFadden (1974). Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. In: P.
Zarembka (Ed), Frontiers in econometrics, NY: Academic Press, 105–142.
D. McFadden (1981). Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice. In: C.Manski and D.
McFadden (Eds), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Economic Applications,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 198–272.
R. D. McKelvey, and T. R. Palfrey (1995). Quantal response equilibria in normal form
games, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 7, pp. 6–38.
R. D. McKelvey, T. R. Palfrey, and R. Weber (2000). The effects of payoff magnitude
and heterogeneity on behavior in 2 × 2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42: 523-548.
B. O’Neill (1987). Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 84: 2106-2109.
P. Mertikopoulos and W. Sandholm (2014). Regularized best response and reinforcement
learning in games, Working Paper.
J-C. Rochet (1987). A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-
linear context. Journal of Mathematical Economics,16: 191-200
R. Rockafellar (1970). Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press.
J. Rust (1994). Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes. In Handbook of
Econometrics, Vol. 4, edited R. Engle and D. McFadden, pp. 3082, 3146. North-
Holland.
B. W. Rogers, T. R. Palfrey, and C.C. Camerer (2009). Heterogeneous quantal response
equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies. Journal of Economic Theory, 144: 1440-1467.
M. Saks and L. Yu (2005). Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains.
in ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Vancouver, Canada: ACM, 286–293.
R. Vohra (2011). Mechanism Design: a Linear Programming Approach. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
F. Wolak (1989). Testing Inequality Constraints in Linear Econometric Models, Journal
of Econometrics, 41: 205–235.
22
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose there are two games that differ only in the payoffs. For M = 2, the cyclic monotonicity
condition (4) reduces to
Ji∑
j=1
(u1ij − u0ij)pi0ij +
Ji∑
j=1
(u0ij − u1ij)pi1ij ≤ 0
or, equivalently,
Ji∑
j=1
(u1ij − u0ij)(pi0ij − pi1ij) ≤ 0 (11)
Suppose that the RHS of (6) is non-negative. Then HHK condition (7) implies CM. To see
this, notice that for non-negative utilities differences in (6)
(u1i1 − u0i1)(pi0i1 − pi1i1) ≤ 0
by HHK condition for k = 1. Then
(u1i2 − u0i2)(pi0i2 − pi1i2) + (u1i1 − u0i1)(pi0i1 − pi1i1) ≤
(u1i2 − u0i2)(pi0i2 − pi1i2) + (u1i2 − u0i2)(pi0i1 − pi1i1) =
(u1i2 − u0i2)((pi0i1 + pi0i2)− (pi1i1 + pi1i2)) ≤ 0
where the last inequality follows from HHK condition for k = 2 and u1i2 − u0i2 ≥ 0. Repeating
the same procedure for k = 3, . . . , Ji, we obtain the CM condition (11) for M = 2.
Conversely, suppose that (11) holds. For the case of two games, (11) holding for all players
is necessary and sufficient to generate QRE-consistent choices. All premises are satisfied for
HHK’s Theorem 2, so condition (7) follows. One can also show it directly. Clearly, given (11),
we can always re-label strategy indices so that (6) holds. Let k = 1 and by way of contradiction,
suppose that (7) is violated, i.e.
pi1i1 − pi0i1 < 0
Since (11) holds, the probabilities in both games are generated by a QRE. Due to indexing in
(6),
u1i1 − u1ij ≥ u0i1 − u0ij
for all j > 1. But then by definition of QRE in (1), pi1i1 ≥ pi0i1. Contradiction, so (7) holds for
k = 1. By induction on the strategy index, one can show that (7) holds for all k ∈ {1, . . . , Ji}.
This completes the proof.
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Appendix B Additional details in computation of
test statistic and sampling distribution
As defined in the main text, the P -dimensional vector ν contains the value of the CM inequalities
evaluated at the choice frequencies observed in the experimental data. Specifically, the `-th
component of ν, corresponding to a given cycle G0, . . . , GL of games is given by
ν` =
GL∑
m=G0
pimi1
[
pim+1k1 u
m+1
i (si1, sk1)− pimk1umi (si1, sk1) + pim+1k2 um+1i (si1, sk2)− pimk2umi (si1, sk2)
+ (1− pim+1k1 − pim+1k2 )um+1i (si1, skJ)− (1− pimk1 − pimk2)umi (si1, skJ)
]
+ pimi2
[
pim+1k1 u
m+1
i (si2, sk1)− pimk1umi (si2, sk1) + pim+1k2 um+1i (si2, sk2)− pimk2umi (si2, sk2)
+ (1− pim+1k1 − pim+1k2 )um+1i (si2, skJ)− (1− pimk1 − pimk2)umi (si2, skJ)
]
+ (1− pimi1 − pimi2)
[
pim+1k1 u
m+1
i (siJ , sk1)− pimk1umi (siJ , sk1)
+ pim+1k2 u
m+1
i (siJ , sk2)− pimk2umi (siJ , sk2)
+ (1− pim+1k1 − pim+1k2 )um+1i (siJ , skJ)− (1− pimk1 − pimk2)umi (siJ , skJ)
]
where we use i to denote the row player, k to denote the column player, and ` changes from 1
to 20. For the column player and ` ∈ [21, 40] the analogous expression is as follows:
ν` =
GL∑
m=G0
pimk1
[
pim+1i1 u
m+1
k (si1, sk1)− pimi1umk (si1, sk1) + pim+1i2 um+1k (si2, sk1)− pimi2umk (si2, sk1)
+ (1− pim+1i1 − pim+1i2 )um+1k (siJ , sk1)− (1− pimi1 − pimi2)umk (siJ , sk1)
]
+ pimk2
[
pim+1i1 u
m+1
k (si1, sk2)− pimi1umk (si1, sk2) + pim+1i2 um+1k (si2, sk2)− pimi2umk (si2, sk2)
+ (1− pim+1i1 − pim+1i2 )um+1k (siJ , sk2)− (1− pimi1 − pimi2)umk (siJ , sk2)
]
+ (1− pimk1 − pimk2)
[
pim+1i1 u
m+1
k (si1, skJ)− pimi1umk (si1, skJ)
+ pim+1i2 u
m+1
k (si2, skJ)− pimi2umk (si2, skJ)
+ (1− pim+1i1 − pim+1i2 )um+1k (siJ , skJ)− (1− pimi1 − pimi2)umk (siJ , skJ)
]
We differentiate the above expressions with respect to pim to obtain a P × 16 estimate of
the Jacobian Jˆ = ∂∂piµ(pˆi) in order to compute an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix
Σˆ[P×P ] = Jˆ Vˆ Jˆ ′ by the Delta method.
For the case of four games, the partial derivatives form the 40× 16 matrix Jˆ . The first 20
rows correspond to the differentiated LHS of the cycles for the row player, and the last 20 rows
correspond to the differentiated LHS of the cycles for the column player. The first 8 columns
correspond to the derivatives with respect to pimi1 , pi
m
i2 , and the last 8 columns correspond to the
derivatives with respect to pimk1, pi
m
k2, m ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.17
17Clearly, the probability to choose Joker can be expressed via the probabilities to choose 1 and 2,
using the total probability constraint.
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Let Sm0 ≡ {` ∈ {1, . . . , 40}|m 6∈ C`} be the set of cycle indices such that correspond-
ing cycles (in the order given in (10)) do not include game m. E.g., for m = 1, Sm0 =
{4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 24, 25, 26, 33, 34}. Let Smi ≡ {` ∈ {1, . . . , 20}|` 6∈ Sm0 } be a subset of cycle indices
that include game m and pertain to the row player, and let Smk ≡ {` ∈ {21, . . . , 40}|` 6∈ Sm0 } be
a subset of cycle indices that include game m and pertain to the column player. Finally, for a
cycle of length L, denote 	 ≡ − mod L subtraction modulus L.
We can now express the derivatives with respect to pimi1 and pi
m
i2 , m ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, in the
following general form. The partial derivatives wrt pimi1 are
∂ν`
∂pimi1
= 0 for ` ∈ Sm0
∂ν`
∂pimi1
= pim+1k1 u
m+1
i (si1, sk1)− pimk1umi (si1, sk1) + pim+1k2 um+1i (si1, sk2)
− pimk2umi (si1, sk2) + (1− pim+1k1 − pim+1k2 )um+1i (si1, skJ)− (1− pimk1 − pimk2)umi (si1, skJ)
− [pim+1k1 um+1i (siJ , sk1)− pimk1umi (siJ , sk1) + pim+1k2 um+1i (siJ , sk2)− pimk2umi (siJ , sk2)
+ (1− pim+1k1 − pim+1k2 )um+1i (siJ , skJ)− (1− pimk1 − pimk2)umi (siJ , skJ)
]
for ` ∈ Smi
∂ν`
∂pimi1
= pimk1 [−umk (si1, sk1) + umk (siJ , sk1)] + pimk2 [−umk (si1, sk2) + umk (siJ , sk2)]
+ (1− pimk1 − pimk2) [−umk (si1, skJ) + umk (siJ , skJ)]
+ pim	1k1 [u
m
k (si1, sk1)− umk (siJ , sk1)] + pim	1k2 [umk (si1, sk2)− umk (siJ , sk2)]
+ (1− pim	1k1 − pim	1k2 ) [umk (si1, skJ)− umk (siJ , skJ)] for ` ∈ Smk
The partial derivatives wrt pimi2 are
∂ν`
∂pimi2
= 0 for ` ∈ Sm0
∂ν`
∂pimi2
=
[
pim+1k1 u
m+1
i (si2, sk1)− pimk1umi (si2, sk1) + pim+1k2 um+1i (si2, sk2)− pimk2umi (si2, sk2)
+ (1− pim+1k1 − pim+1k2 )um+1i (si2, skJ)− (1− pimk1 − pimk2)umi (si2, skJ)
]
− [pim+1k1 um+1i (siJ , sk1)− pimk1umi (siJ , sk1) + pim+1k2 um+1i (siJ , sk2)− pimk2umi (siJ , sk2)
+ (1− pim+1k1 − pim+1k2 )um+1i (siJ , skJ)− (1− pimk1 − pimk2)umi (siJ , skJ)
]
for ` ∈ Smi
∂ν`
∂pimi2
= pimk1 [−umk (si2, sk1) + umk (siJ , sk1)] + pimk2 [−umk (si2, sk2) + umk (siJ , sk2)]
+ (1− pimk1 − pimk2) [−umk (si2, skJ) + umk (siJ , skJ)]
+ pim	1k1 [u
m
k (si2, sk1)− umk (siJ , sk1)] + pim	1k2 [umk (si2, sk2)− umk (siJ , sk2)]
+ (1− pim	1k1 − pim	1k2 ) [umk (si2, skJ)− umk (siJ , skJ)] for ` ∈ Smk
To obtain the derivatives with respect to pimk1 and pi
m
k2, one just needs to use the corresponding
partial derivatives wrt pimi1 and pi
m
i2 , and exchange everywhere the subscripts i and k, so we omit
the derivation. For the sake of completenes, though, we list the indices subsets for each game
m ∈ {1, .., 4} in Table 4.
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Table 4: Sets of cycle indices for each game.
m Sm0 S
m
i S
m
k
1 4, 5, 6, 13, 14,
24, 25, 26, 33, 34
1, 2, 3, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20
21, 22, 23, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, 32, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40
2 2, 3, 6, 10, 12,
22, 23, 26, 30, 32
1, 4, 5, 7, 8,
9, 11, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20
21, 24, 25, 27, 28,
29, 31, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40
3 1, 3, 5, 8, 11,
21, 23, 25, 28, 31
2, 4, 6, 7, 9,
10, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20
22, 24, 26, 27, 29,
30, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40
4 1, 2, 4, 7, 9
21, 22, 24, 27, 29
3, 5, 6, 8, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20
23, 25, 26, 28, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40
Notes. The cycle indices are for the row player. To obtain the corresponding column
player cycle indices, swap the last two columns.
Appendix C Experiment Instructions
The instructions in the experiment, given below, largely follow McKelvey, Palfrey, & Weber
(2000).
This is an experiment in decision making, and you will be paid for your participation in
cash. Different subjects may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your
decisions and partly on the decisions of others.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction be-
tween subjects will take place through the computers. It is important that you do not talk or
in any way try to communicate with other subjects during the experiment. If you violate the
rules, we may ask you to leave the experiment.
We will start with a brief instruction period. If you have any questions during the instruction
period, raise your hand and your question will be answered so everyone can hear. If any
difficulties arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will
come and assist you.
This experiment consists of several periods or matches and will take between 30 to 60
minutes. I will now describe what occurs in each match.
[Turn on the projector]
First, you will be randomly paired with another subject, and each of you will simultaneously
be asked to make a choice.
Each subject in each pair will be asked to choose one of the three rows in the table which
will appear on the computer screen, and which is also shown now on the screen at the front
of the room. Your choices will be always displayed as rows of this table, while your partner’s
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choices will be displayed as columns. It will be the other way round for your partner: for them,
your choices will be displayed as columns, and their choices as rows.
You can choose the first, the second, or the third row. Neither you nor your partner will be
informed of what choice the other has made until after all choices have been made.
After each subject has made his or her choice, payoffs for the match are determined based
on the choices made. Payoffs to you are indicated by the red numbers in the table, while payoffs
to your partner are indicated by the blue numbers. Each cell represents a pair of payoffs from
your choice and the choice of your partner. The units are in francs, which will be exchanged to
US dollars at the end of the experiment.
For example, if you choose ’A’ and your partner chooses ’D’, you receive a payoff of 10
francs, while your partner receives a payoff of 20 francs. If you choose ’A’ and your partner
chooses ’F’, you receive a payoff of 30 francs, while your partner receives a payoff of 30 francs.
If you choose ’C’ and your partner chooses ’E’, you receive a payoff of 10 francs, while your
partner receives a payoff of 20 francs. And so on.
Once all choices have been made the resulting payoffs and choices are displayed, the history
panel is updated and the match is completed.
[show the slide with a completed match]
This process will be repeated for several matches. The end of the experiment will be
announced without warning. In every match, you will be randomly paired with a new subject.
The identity of the person you are paired with will never be revealed to you. The payoffs and
the labels may change every match.
After some matches, we will ask you to indicate what you think is the likelihood that your
current partner has made a particular choice. This is what it looks like.
[show slide with belief elicitation]
Suppose you think that your partner has a 15% chance of choosing ’D’ and a 60% chance
of choosing ’E’. Indicate your opinion using the slider, and then press ’Confirm’. Once all
subjects have indicated their opinions and confirmed them, the resulting payoffs and choices
are displayed, the history panel is updated and the match is completed as usual.
Your final earnings for the experiment will be the sum of your payoffs from all matches.
This amount in francs will be exchanged into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate of 90 cents
for 100 francs. You will see your total payoff in dollars at the end of the experiment. You will
also receive a show-up fee of $7. Are there any questions about the procedure?
[wait for response]
We will now start with four practice matches. Your payoffs from the practice matches are
not counted in your total. In the first three matches you will be asked to choose one of the
three rows of a table. In the fourth match you will be also asked to indicate your opinion about
the likelihood of your partner’s choices for each of three actions. Is everyone ready?
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[wait for response]
Now please double click on the ’Client Multistage’ icon on your desktop. The program will
ask you to type in your name. Please type in the number of your computer station instead.
[wait for subjects to connect to server]
We will now start the practice matches. Do not hit any keys or click the mouse button until
you are told to do so.
[start first practice match]
You see the experiment screen. In the middle of the screen is the table which you have
previously seen up on the screen at the front of the room. At the top of the screen, you see
your subject ID number, and your computer name. You also see the history panel which is
currently empty.
We will now start the first practice match. Remember, do not hit any keys or click the
mouse buttons until you are told to do so. You are all now paired with someone from this class
and asked to choose one of the three rows. Exactly half of your see label ’A’ at the left hand
side of the top row, while the remaining half now see label ’D’ at the same row.
Now, all of you please move the mouse so that it is pointing to the top row. You will see
that the row is highlighted in red. Move the mouse to the bottom row and the highlighting goes
along with the mouse. To choose a row you just click on it. Now please click once anywhere on
the bottom row.
[Wait for subjects to move mouse to appropriate row]
After all subjects have confirmed their choices, the match is over. The outcome of this
match, ’C’-’F’, is now highlighted on everybody’s screen. Also, note that the moves and payoffs
of the match are recorded in the history panel. The outcomes of all of your previous matches will
be recorded there throughout the experiment so that you can refer back to previous outcomes
whenever you like. The payoff to the subject who chose ’C’ for this match is 20, and the payoff
to the subject who chose F is ’10’.
You are not being paid for the practice session, but if this were the actual experiment, then
the payoff you see on the screen would be money (in francs) you have earned from the first
match. The total you earn over all real matches, in addition to the show-up fee, is what you
will be paid for your participation in the experiment.
We will now proceed to the second practice match.
[Start second match]
For the second match, you have been randomly paired with a different subject. You are not
paired with the same person you were paired with in the first match. The rules for the second
match are exactly like for the first. Please make your choices.
[Wait for subjects]
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We will now proceed to the third practice match. The rules for the third match are exactly
like the first. Please make your choices.
[Start third match]
We will now proceed to the fourth practice match. The rules for the fourth match are
exactly like the first. Please make your choices.
[Wait for subjects]
Now that you have made your choice, you see that a slider appears asking you to indicate
the relative likelihood of your partner choosing each of the available actions. There is also
a confirmation button. Please indicate your opinion by adjusting the thumbs and then press
’Confirm’.
[wait for subjects]
This is the end of the practice match. Are there any questions?
[wait for response]
Now let’s start the actual experiment. If there are any problems from this point on, raise
your hand and an experimenter will come and assist you. Please pull up the dividers between
your cubicles.
[start the actual session]
The experiment is now completed. Thank you all very much for participating in this ex-
periment. Please record your total payoff from the matches in U.S. dollars at the experiment
record sheet. Please add your show-up fee and write down the total, rounded up to the nearest
dollar. After you are done with this, please remain seated. You will be called by your computer
name and paid in the office at the back of the room one at a time. Please bring all your things
with you when you go to the back office. You can leave the experiment through the back door
of the office.
Please refrain from discussing this experiment while you are waiting to receive payment so
that privacy regarding individual choices and payoffs may be maintained.
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